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Introduction 
Appellant Marco Fanari, by and through his lawyers D. Gilbert 
Athay and Michael R. Sikora, and pursuant to Rule 3 5 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure, petitions this Court for rehearing in 
the above-captioned appeal. Fanari raised two issues on appeal. 
First, he argued that the arresting officer did not have grounds to 
conduct a traffic stop for "weaving" in the lane. Second, Fanari 
argued that the arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion 
to extend the scope of the detention to a narcotics investigation. 
On December 3, 1998, this Court released an unpublished 
decision, affirming the district court's denial of Fanari's motion 
to suppress. For the reasons outlined in this petition, Fanari 
requests this Court to grant the petition for rehearing in order to 
revisit his claims for relief under the Fourth Amendment to the 
Untied States Constitution. 
Argument 
1. The facts surrounding the traffic stop were 
not fully addressed by this Court, and such 
facts did not justify the initial seizure. 
In the memorandum decision [hereinafter "the decision"], this 
Court first addressed whether Fanari's driving pattern justified 
the traffic stop. The decision notes that under State v. Bello, 
871 P.2d 584, 587 (Utah Ct. App. ) , cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 
(Utah 1994), "a 'single instance of weaving . . . cannot serve as 
the constitutional basis for stopping' a driver for suspicion of 
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driving while impaired, nor for violating Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
61(1) (1993), which requires drivers to operate their vehicles 'as 
nearly as practical' within a single lane. The decision then 
pointed out that the analysis may turn on mitigating circumstances, 
and that in Bello the driving pattern could have easily been caused 
by extreme wind and the camper shell on the back of the pickup 
truck. 
However, in the analysis of the facts on appeal, the Court 
failed to address the mitigating circumstances in Fanari's case. 
First, the arresting officer admitted that Fanari was traveling 
directly behind a semi-truck. (Preliminary Hearing Transcript at 
8, 11) [Hereinafter "Trans."] Second, the officer also conceded 
that this occurred a windy day, and in fact that it is almost 
always windy on that stretch of highway. (Trans, at 11) 
The decision failed to analyze to what extend these factors 
mitigated the driving pattern observed by the arresting officer. 
Moroever, the officer's description of the driving pattern was 
anything but concrete. For example, on cross-examination he 
admitted that in his police report he stated that Fanari's car "was 
weaving from the fog line to the center line." (Trans, at 9, 10) 
The officer also testified that upon approaching Fanari he told 
Fanari that the car was going from the fog line to the center line. 
(Trans, at 12) Moroever, this occurred within about twenty to 
thirty seconds. (Trans, at 8). The officer did not observe a 
protracted driving pattern, but rather he saw the car move 
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laterally within its lane over, from fog line to center line, over 
a very short stretch of highway. This happened on a windy day and 
Fanari was travelling directly behind a semi truck. Fanari's lane 
travel was "practical" under then-existing traffic and wind 
conditions, especially since the record is at best sketchy about 
what the testifying officer actually saw. Fanari requests a 
rehearing to more thoroughly flush out the facts relating to the 
driving pattern since those facts do not demonstrate that Fanari 
violated § 41-6-61(1). See also United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 
973 (10th Cir. 1996) ; United States v. Lyons, 7 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 
1993) (both cases analyzed in Appellant's Brief). 
2. The factors relied upon by this Court do not 
support a basis to conclude that the officer 
had reasonable suspicion to extend the 
detention. 
First, the decision states that reasonable suspicion was based 
at least in part on "peculiar account of the trunk's contents." In 
fact the contents of the trunk was not known until long after the 
officer extended the scope of the detention because Fanari did not 
provide the officers with his consent to search the trunk. (Trans, 
at 24-25) Such a finding, then is not supported by the record and 
should not have been included in the Court's analysis. 
Second, without support in the record the decision states that 
Fanari exhibited "extreme nervousness." In fact, not even the 
State has characterized it that way. In its Brief on Appeal, the 
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State asserted that Fanari was "unusually nervous" during the stop, 
and for support cites to pages 14-16 of the preliminary hearing 
transcript. Reviewing those pages of the transcript, the officer 
did not describe the quality of nervousness as either "extreme" or 
"unusual." It is inappropriate to characterize a record fact in 
terms not supported by the testimony or other evidence, and then 
base a legal conclusion in whole or in part on that 
characterization. Fanari's nervousness was of no consequence and 
should not have been considered in the reasonable suspicion 
calculus. 
Third, Fanari's travel plans and the officer's conclusion 
regarding the so-called lack of convergence test are also of no 
significance, and were not adequately analyzed in the decision. 
Most troubling of all with respect to the rental agreement, travel 
plans, and suspicion of DUI is that the investigating officers did 
absolutely nothing to confirm or dispel their suspicion. 
Accordingly, Trooper Avery did not even raise the issue of the 
alleged suspicious itinerary with Fanari. A fair inference is that 
Avery wanted to continue the detention, and asking specific 
questions may well have resulted in reasonable answers. Reasonable 
answers cannot justify reasonable suspicion. The message is clear: 
and officer is well advised to refrain from making inquiries 
because lack of information will provide the officer with the 
requisite fact. Sometimes, the fewer facts available the better it 
is for law enforcement. 
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The decision also rests on the conclusion that the officers 
had reasonable suspicion that Fanari was driving while impaired or 
under the influence. Again, as in the preceding paragraph, the 
officers had no real interest in making further investigations. 
After the eye convergence test, nothing else was done to determine 
if Fanari was impaired. No other field sobriety tests were given, 
even though there was plenty of time to do so. Fanari was never 
cited for DUI. This is about the integrity of the system. The 
record supports a conclusion that the detention was simply a 
pretext to search for drugs, and that the factors relied upon, if 
closely and thoroughly analyzed, did not justify the detention. 
Conclusion 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Fanari requests 
this Court to rehear his appeal and to closely scrutinize all of 
the facts relevant to the issues presented. 
DATED this day of December 1998. 
V^MM ) 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
MICHAEL R. SIKORA 
Lawyers for Defendant 
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